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The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain

Received: 7 January 2019     Accepted: 25 February 2019     Published: 20 March 2019
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Abstract

More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.

Published in International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems (Volume 8, Issue 1)
DOI 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
Page(s) 6-11
Creative Commons

This is an Open Access article, distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, provided the original work is properly cited.

Copyright

Copyright © The Author(s), 2019. Published by Science Publishing Group

Keywords

Dual-channel Supply Chain, Stackelberg Game, Service Level

References
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[2] Liang xi, Huang chengfeng, Xie shuiqing. Influence of direct selling cost on sales channel decision in dual-channel supply chain [J]. Industrial engineering, 2010 (4).
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[4] Khouja M, Park S, Cai G. Channel selection and pricing in the presence of retail-captive consumers [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2010, 125 (1): 84-95.
[5] Xu G, Dan B, Zhang X, et al. Coordinating a dual-channel supply chain with risk-averse under a two-way revenue sharing contract [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2014, 147 (1): 171-179.
[6] Cai G, Zhang Z G, Zhang M. Game theoretical perspectives on dual-channel supply chain competition with price discounts and pricing schemes [J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2009, 117 (1): 80-96.
[7] Yue X, Liu J. Demand forecast sharing in a dual-channel supply chain [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2006, 174 (1): 646-667.
[8] Hua G, Wang S, Cheng T C E. Price and lead time decisions in dual-channel supply chains [J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 205 (1): 113-126.
[9] Chan T Y, Narasimhan C, Yoon Y. Advertising and price competition in a manufacturer-retailer channel [J]. International Journal of Research in Marketing, 2017: S0167811617300319.
[10] Huang S, Yang C, Zhang X. Pricing and production decisions in dual-channel supply chains with demand disruptions [M]. Pergamum Press, Inc. 2012.
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[12] Zheng H Z, Chu D H, Zhan D C, et al. DUAL SALES CHANNEL MANAGEMENT WITH SERVICE COMPETITION[C]// International Conference on Machine Learning & Cybernetics. 2008.
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Cite This Article
  • APA Style

    Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. (2019). The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems, 8(1), 6-11. https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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    ACS Style

    Nie Qixuan; Xie Fengqin; Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int. J. Intell. Inf. Syst. 2019, 8(1), 6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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    AMA Style

    Nie Qixuan, Xie Fengqin, Yu Hongfei. The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain. Int J Intell Inf Syst. 2019;8(1):6-11. doi: 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12

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  • @article{10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12,
      author = {Nie Qixuan and Xie Fengqin and Yu Hongfei},
      title = {The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain},
      journal = {International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems},
      volume = {8},
      number = {1},
      pages = {6-11},
      doi = {10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
      url = {https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12},
      eprint = {https://article.sciencepublishinggroup.com/pdf/10.11648.j.ijiis.20190801.12},
      abstract = {More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.},
     year = {2019}
    }
    

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  • TY  - JOUR
    T1  - The Coordination Decision of Dual-Channel Fresh Food Supply Chain
    AU  - Nie Qixuan
    AU  - Xie Fengqin
    AU  - Yu Hongfei
    Y1  - 2019/03/20
    PY  - 2019
    N1  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
    DO  - 10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
    T2  - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
    JF  - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
    JO  - International Journal of Intelligent Information Systems
    SP  - 6
    EP  - 11
    PB  - Science Publishing Group
    SN  - 2328-7683
    UR  - https://doi.org/10.11648/j.ijiis.20190801.12
    AB  - More and more suppliers in fresh food supply chain expand online channels using fresh food e-commerce platform, forming a dual-channel supply chain model. The competition of market resources will lead to channel conflict in the dual-channel fresh food supply chain. The level of service is one of the important reasons for the conflict in the fresh food supply chain. Service is an important factor influencing the shopping decision of consumers. This paper studies a dual-channel supply chain consisting of a fresh food supplier and a fresh food retailer. The supplier wholesale fresh food to the retailer while developing its own online channel. In this paper, the Stackelberg game model is used to solve the equilibrium state of service level between the supplier and the retailer in the dual-channel supply chain. Both the supplier and the retailer aim to maximize profits. The supplier is the game leader. It first decides the wholesale price and the service level of the online channel. The retailer is the follower. It makes decisions based on the supplier’s decisions. The study found that the supplier and the retailer can attract more customers by improving service level, thus increasing profits. Weighing the relationship between service level and operation cost is a major problem in operation.
    VL  - 8
    IS  - 1
    ER  - 

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Author Information
  • College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China

  • College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China

  • College of Transportation, Shandong University of Science and Technology, Qingdao, China

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